Bucketsquatting is (finally) dead(onecloudplease.com)
75 points byboyter2 hours ago |12 comments
josephg14 minutes ago
Sometimes I wonder if package names, bucket names, github account names and so on should use a naming scheme like discord. Eg, @sometag-xxxx where xxxx is a random 4 digit code. Its sort of a middleground between UUID account names and completely human generated names.

This approach goes a long way toward democratizing the name space, since nobody can "own" the tag prefix. (10000 people can all share it). This can also be used to prevent squatting and reuse attacks - just burn the full account name if the corresponding user account is ever shut down. And it prevents early users from being able to snap up all the good names.

jorams2 minutes ago
Notably Discord stopped using that format two years ago, moving to globally unique usernames.

Their stated reason[1] for doing so being:

> This lets you have the same username as someone else as long as you have different discriminators or different case letters. However, this also means you have to remember a set of 4-digit numbers and account for case sensitivity to connect with your friends.

[1]: https://support.discord.com/hc/en-us/articles/12620128861463...

rithdmc7 minutes ago
I like it for buckets, but adding a four digit code won't help with the package hijacking side of things - in fact might just introduce more typo/hijack potential. It'll just be four more characters for people to typo.
donmcronald9 minutes ago
I just want to be able to use a verified domain; @example.com everywhere.
Cthulhu_7 minutes ago
That still has "squatting" risks as described in the original article though, domains expire and / or can be taken over.
iknownothow35 minutes ago
Thank you author Ian Mckay! This is one of those good hygiene conventions that save time by not having to think/worry each time buckets are named. As pointed out in the article, AWS seems to have made this part of their official naming conventions [1].

I'm excited for IaC code libraries like Terraform to incorporate this as their default behavior soon! The default behavior of Terraform and co is already to add a random hash suffix to the end of the bucket name to prevent such errors. This becoming standard practice in itself has saved me days in not having to convince others to use such strategies prior to automation.

[1] https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/aws/introducing-account-regiona...

vhab1 hour ago
> For Azure Blob Storage, storage accounts are scoped with an account name and container name, so this is far less of a concern.

The author probably misunderstood what "account name" is in Azure Storage's context, as it's pretty much the equivalent of S3's bucket name, and is definitely still a large concern.

A single pool of unique names for storage accounts across all customers has been a very large source of frustration, especially with the really short name limit of only 24 characters.

I hope Microsoft follows suit and introduces a unique namespace per customer as well.

iann003649 minutes ago
Author here. Thanks for the call out! I've updated the article with attribution.
ryanjshaw1 hour ago
I recall being shocked the first time I used Azure and realizing so many resources aren’t namespaced to account level. Bizarre to me this wasn’t a v1 concern.
calmworm1 hour ago
That took a decade to resolve? Surprising, but hindsight is 20/20 I guess.
alemwjsl29 minutes ago
I take it advertising your account id isn't a security risk?
Cthulhu_6 minutes ago
Armchair opinion, but shouldn't be too bad - it's identification, not authentication, just like your e-mail address is.

But probably best to not advertise it too much.

aduwah25 minutes ago
It is not hygienic, but with only the account-id you are fine. In the IAM rules the attacker can always just use a * on their end, so it does not make a difference. You have to be conscious to set proper rules for your (owner) end tho.
INTPenis1 hour ago
I started treating long random bucketnames as secrets years ago. Ever since I noticed hackers were discovering buckets online with secrets and healthcare info.

This is where IaC shines.

Galanwe48 minutes ago
This is all good and we'll on the IaC side,yes. But at the end of the day, buckets are also user facing resources, and nobody likes random directory / bucket names.
amluto9 minutes ago
It would be nice if the other end of this could be addressed: a configurable policy to limit resolution of bucket names within an account namespace. Ideally, if someone doesn’t have permission to resolve a bucket name, they shouldn’t even be able to detect whether it exists.
XorNot55 minutes ago
I just started using hashes for names. The deployment tooling knows the "real" name. The actual deployment hash registers a salt+hash of that name to produce a pseudo-random string name.
Aardwolf1 hour ago
Why all that stuff with namespaces when they could just not allow name reuse?
orf9 minutes ago
That would be a huge breaking change. Any workload that relies on re-using a bucket name would be broken, and at the scale of S3 that would have a non-trivial customer impact.

Not to mention the ergonomics would suck - suddenly your terraform destroy/apply loop breaks if there’s a bucket involved

afandian3 minutes ago
Any workload that relies on re-using a bucket name is broken by design. If someone else can get it, then it's Undefined Behaviour. So it's in keeping with the contract for AWS to prevent re-use. Surely?
iknownothow45 minutes ago
Potential reasons I can think of for why they don't disallow name reuse:

a) AWS will need to maintain a database of all historical bucket names to know what to disallow. This is hard per region and even harder globally. Its easier to know what is currently in use rather know what has been used historically.

b) Even if they maintained a database of all historically used bucket names, then the latency to query if something exists in it may be large enough to be annoying during bucket creation process. Knowing AWS, they'll charge you for every 1000 requests for "checking if bucket name exists" :p

c) AWS builds many of its own services on S3 (as indicated in the article) and I can imagine there may be many of their internal services that just rely on existing behaviour i.e. allowing for re-creating the same bucket name.

dwedge18 minutes ago
I can't accept a) or b). They already need to keep a database of all existing bucket names globally, and they already need to check this on bucket creation. Adding a flag on deleted doesn't seem like a big loss.

As for c), I assume it's not just AWS relying on this behaviour. https://xkcd.com/1172/

CodesInChaos1 hour ago
I'd allow re-use, but only by the original account. Not being able to re-create a bucket after deleting it would be annoying.

I think that's an important defense that AWS should implement for existing buckets, to complement account scoped bucket.

thih91 hour ago
> If you wish to protect your existing buckets, you’ll need to create new buckets with the namespace pattern and migrate your data to those buckets.

My pet conspiracy theory: this article was written by bucket squatters who want to claim old bucket names after AI agents read this and blindly follow.

lijok1 hour ago
Huh? Hash your bucket names
why_only_151 hour ago
if your bucket name is ever exposed and you later delete it, then this doesn't help you.
Maxion1 hour ago
I don't think that'd prevent this attack vector.
alemwjsl32 minutes ago
Ok; salt, and then hash your bucket names